Commentary on Campolo by Gilbert, Michael A
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 4
May 17th, 9:00 AM - May 19th, 5:00 PM
Commentary on Campolo
Michael A. Gilbert
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Michael A. Gilbert, "Commentary on Campolo" (May 17, 2001). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 12.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA4/papersandcommentaries/12
Author: Michael A. Gilbert 
In Response to: Chris Campolo’s Agreement and Argumentation 
© 2001 Michael A. Gilbert 
 
I have a standard pedagogical trick I use in critical reasoning classes. In the midst of a 
lecture I seem to suddenly remember something, pause, then turn to the class and say, “Sorry, 
almost forgot. I’ve got a petition here against hanging. It’s legal in (say) Louisiana, and I’m 
hoping I can get some people to sign it. Who’d be willing?” Invariably, a number of hands go up. 
“That’s great, thanks. You see hanging is too fast, and we’re hoping to replace it with something 
more painful.”  
The point, of course, is that it is dangerous to agree with a claim without first identifying the 
reasons for it. Campolo’s paper concerns the nature of claims qua propositions, and argues that a 
surprising amount of the time, the “hanging claim” problem does not, in fact, occur. Rather, the 
proposition that identifies the claim works well as a signal for the complex position and is 
understood by all hands in the discussion. In this I believe he is largely correct. The difficulties 
arise, not in thinking that we can agree on propositions understood as position icons, but by 
assuming that said agreement means there is further agreement on ancillary beliefs and decisions.  
Consider two paradigm examples of unproblematic cases of agreement on “lonely 
propositions” (to use Campolo’s phrase).  
1) You get me to agree that we should go hiking this weekend, so I plan my whole 
week accordingly.   
2) I agree with you that the cat is acting strangely, so we prepare to bring him to the 
vet.   
Very well, Campolo gets me to agree to go hiking. As a result, I make sure that I will not 
have to work this weekend. But, where are we going? When I agreed, did I agree to a vigorous 
hike up and down the Niagara Escarpment? Or a more leisurely sojourn that might be an excuse 
for a picnic? Of course, we might be such regular hiking partners that no more needs to be said, 
but even in that case, the position will surely be a bit richer. “Shall we,” I respond, “tackle the 
Tobermory section this time?” Or “Great, but I don’t think I’m up for the deep woods in this 
heat.”  
Campolo writes, “…in everyday communicative and argumentative discourse we do indeed 
seek agreement on a position by seeking assent to a proposition.  It’s as if by getting you to 
accept the proposition that I employ to represent my position, I can be assured that you will hold 
the same position.” I think this is a safe assertion, but we must be cautious in a way that I believe 
Campolo will accept. Yes, we often use statements to represent positions. Yes, sometimes by 
getting your assent to that statement I am reassured that we hold the same position. But, I do not 
think that the assent to an iconic statement representing a position is often sufficient to warrant 
my being assured that we are, in fact, holders of the same or relevantly similar, positions. Most 
often, save for the most mundane and familiar communicative interactions, at least some more is 
required. 
It must be remembered that the situations being considered are ones in which there is 
disagreement. If there is not, then agreement may be swift and not need any checking at all. 
When my mate and I are arranging a pub date, and I say, “Usual place, 5.30?” and he responds, 
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“Yes,” nothing more is needed. As soon, however, as he says, “Well, I’m going to be uptown,” 
then a new negotiation must commence. But arguments centred on a disagreement that end in 
agreement normally have some investigative aspect attached. Of course, in cases such as 
Campolo’s example [1] there is an assumption made about the acceptance of a position just 
because there was no apparent disagreement. It is, in fact, in those cases, as in my hanging 
example above, that danger lurks. It is very upsetting to believe you have agreement when, in 
fact, there are important components of the two positions that do not overlap. 
Some agreements also entail other discussions. The second and fourth examples, the former 
concerning Western Civ. becoming broader based, and the latter about the Smith family 
vacation, involve an agreement about one thing that means there must be a further discussion of 
another. The college course case involves what is sometimes called an “agreement in principle.” 
We agree that it is a good idea to broaden the intro course to include cultural diversity, but the 
ways and means of doing that need to be worked out. That does not mean there was no real 
agreement on changing the course, but that the position was about just that: the course needs 
changing, and the serious business of just how that needs to be done is something else entirely. 
The Smiths and their elusive vacation is particularly interesting since there is so little 
disagreement. It is difficult to speculate about the dynamics of the situation without knowing a 
great deal more, but if we take the example at face value then the situation is one in which the 
two parties each understand the other’s position, but have different attitudes or emotional 
reactions to the various destinations. In other words, Mr. Smith fully understands Junior’s desire 
to go to Baja and go surfing and thinks it is a warranted and reasonable view. Nonetheless, he 
and Mrs. Smith put a very high rating on the fine cuisine available in the keys. Junior, in turn, 
knows how important good restaurants are to his parents, but for him a holiday ought include 
surfing. And so on. In short, in no way is simply having a real understanding of someone’s 
position a guarantee of agreement. Clearly, some negotiation is called for here.   
Campolo says that, “a position, though it may contain many different elements, is an 
essentially organized affair, and its organization can be discerned by examining the proposition it 
hangs on.” And, shortly thereafter, he explains that positions are actually answers to questions, 
and that, “If we can figure out a speaker’s implicit question, and think of the proposition he 
offers as an answer, we can identify and map some important elements in the structure of his 
position.” However, it strikes me that the way in which a proposition can be used to examine the 
organization of a position is by asking questions about it, or inspecting whether or not your 
opposer holds the corollaries you derive from it. Determining the position as an answer to a 
question may work when the proposition used is an answer to a simple question and will be 
understood by both parties. But, in fact, we do not always understand the implications of our 
own positions, let alone other’s.  
The idea of a position being an answer to a question strikes me as a handy metaphor in 
certain circumstances, but it is liable to be forced in others.  In the example concerning the 
bridge that was washed out, Campolo says that the response, “Take Ocean Heights,” is an answer 
to an implicit question. This may be, insofar as every statement, a la Jeopardy, can be construed 
as an answer to a question, but how far does it get us. Someone making that assertion may not 
see themselves as answering a question, but as giving instructions. Does that make a difference? 
In the Mary & Sue abortion case–they agree on everything but what to do in cases of rape. 
How can we know what “questions” they revolve around? And why questions? Why not visions? 
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In fact, if followed through the disagreement will reveal a number of very deep rooted and 
profound issues and which they do not agree at all. Some of these may go right to the heart of 
their beliefs about religion, God, obedience to canon law, and so on. Similarly, I am confused as 
to why the Sarah and Jane duck hunting example is construed as involving answers to different 
questions. Jane answers the question, Why is it wrong to hunt? with the answer, It is wrong to be 
cruel to animals. Sarah, with the answer, It’s wrong to hunt if done in a cruel way. It strikes me 
that they do not have different answers because they are answering different questions, but 
because they have different positions on hunting and its relationship to cruelty to animals. 
My concern here is a familiar one. It may indeed be the case that viewing a disagreement in 
terms of questions and answers offers helpful insight into the positions and priorities of the 
participants. I have no quarrel with this, and can see the process as a useful heuristic in 
uncovering differences and similarities. My fear is that we are liable to see the questions and 
their answers as simple statements and, as a result, ignore the complexity of the positions they 
represent. All of the examples demonstrate that agreement with propositions is fraught with 
difficulty, and that the more complex a position is, the less known to each other are the dispute 
partners, the less likely is it safe to rely on a statement as being the position. 
